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For purposes of this brief individual documents contained 
within the record will be referred to as "(R. )", references to 
the docket as "(Doc. )", references to the partial hearing 
transcript of the testimony of Susan Patten on June 23, 1997 as 
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 (Tr. )" and the transcript of the trial judge's ruling ordering 
a mistrial on June 23, 1997 will be referred to as "(J.R. )". 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an interlocutory appeal from the Third District 
Court? s denial of Defendantf s Motion to Dismiss on Double Jeopardy 
and Improper Termination Grounds (R. 169, 170) by Memorandum 
Decision, March 18, 1998 (R. 41-43; 87-89; 172-174) with respect to 
the trial court's prior Order Of Mistrial of October 2, 1997 (R. 
67, 68). 
Defendant' s Petition for Interlocutory Appeal pursuant to Rule 
5, Utah R. App. P., was filed April 6, 1998 and granted by this 
Court? s Order Granting Petition For Permission to Appeal from 
Interlocutory Order on or about May 12, 1998. 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant 
to § 78-2a-3(2)(d), U.C.A., as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
I. DID THE DECLARATION OF MISTRIAL CONSTITUTE JEOPARDY? 
The first question presented by this appeal is whether the 
trial court's declaration of mistrial was based upon circumstances 
not amounting to "absolute" or "manifest" necessity, thus invoking 
the protection of the double jeopardy clauses of the Fifth 
Amendment, United States Constitution and Art. I, Sec. 14, Utah 
State Constitution, thereby barring retrial of the defendant. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review with respect to a trial court's ruling 
on a mistrial is whether the trial court abused its discretion. 
State v. Castle, 951 P.2d 1109 (Ut. App. 1998). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN TRIAL COURT 
The trial court declared a mistrial in open court on or about 
June 23, 1997. (Tr. Judge's Ruling, 2-5) A formal Order of 
Mistrial was entered on or about October 2, 1997. (R. 67, 68). On 
or about November 4, 1997 defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on 
Double Jeopardy and Improper Termination Grounds. (R. 169, 170) 
© 
The trial court denied this motion by Memorandum Decision on or 
about March 18, 1998. (R. 41-43; 87-89; 172-174) 
II. DID THE DECLARATION OF MISTRIAL AMOUNT TO AN IMPROPER 
TERMINATION? 
The second question presented by this appeal is whether the 
trial court's declaration of mistrial was an "improper termination" 
pursuant to § 76-1-403, U.C.A., as amended, thus barring retrial of 
the accused. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Statutory interpretation is a question of law which the Court 
of Appeals reviews for correctness, granting no deference to the 
trial courtf s determinations. Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
911 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah App. 1996). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN TRIAL COURT 
The trial court declared a mistrial in open court on or about 
June 23, 1997. (Tr. Judge's Ruling, 2-5) A formal Order of 
Mistrial was entered on or about October 2, 1997. (R. 67, 68). On 
or about November 4, 1997 defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on 
Double Jeopardy and Improper Termination Grounds. (R. 169, 170) 
The trial court denied this motion by Memorandum Decision on or 
about March 18, 1998. (R. 41-43; 87-89; 172-174) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Constitutional provisions of central importance to this appeal 
are the double jeopardy provisions of both the Utah State and 
federal constitutions, set forth in pertinent part as follows: 
... nor shall any person be subject for the same offense 
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.... 
Amendment V, United States Constitution. 
... nor shall any person be twice be put in jeopardy for 
the same offense. 
Article I, §12, Constitution of Utah. 
A statute central to this appeal is § 76-1-403, U.C.A., as 
amended, entitled "Former Prosecution Barring Subsequent 
Prosecution For Offense Out Of Same Episode." A copy of § 76-1-
403, U.C.A. is set forth in its entirety in the Appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged under § 76-5-108, U.C.A., alleging 
violation of a protective order, a class A misdemeanors, by three 
separate Informations filed on or about February 28, 1997 (cases 
#971000887, #971000888, #971tfOt9). The trial court consolidated 
the three Informations for all purposes including trial. (Doc. 3-
17-97) Defendant entered pleas of not guilty. (Doc. 3-4-97) 
A bench trial was conducted, the Honorable Ronald Nehring, 
Judge presiding, on or about the 23rd of June, 1997. (Doc. 6-23-
97) Witnesses were sworn and testified on behalf of the 
prosecution. (Doc. 6-23-97) Prior to the City resting its case, 
the court declared a mistrial. (Doc. 6-23-97) The trial court's 
formal Order of Mistrial was made and entered October 2, 1997. (R. 
67, 68). 
On or about November 3, 1997, defendant filed Motions to 
Dismiss on Double Jeopardy and Improper Termination Grounds with 
supporting memorandum. (R. 169; 139-152) The City responded on 
November 21, 1997 with its Objection to Motion to Dismiss. (R. 69-
Q 
78) The defendant replied with a Response to Plaintiff's Objection 
to Motion to Dismiss, January 22, 1998. (R. 79-86) 
Oral argument was entertained on January 26, 1998 (Doc. 1-26-
98) and on or about March 18, 1998, Judge Judith S. H. Atherton, 
denied the Defendant's motions by Memorandum Decision (R. 41-43; 
87-89; 172-174). 
The defendant petitioned this court for permission to take an 
appeal from that interlocutory order, April 6, 1998, which was 
granted, May 12, 1998. This is an appeal from Judge Judith 
Athertonfs interlocutory Order of March 18, 1998, denying 
Defendant's Motions to Dismiss. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The defendant was charged by three Informations, each filed on 
or about February 28, 1997 with violation of a protective order in 
a domestic case pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 36 (R. 1, 2, 45, 46, 
115, 116), cases number 971000887, 971000888, and 971000889 
respectively. Roger Sandack entered his appearance representing 
the defendant (R. 15), the matters were consolidated for trial 
(Doc. 3-17-97) and the defendant entered pleas of not guilty (Doc. 
3-4-97). 
A number of witnesses were called in the consolidated cases at 
the bench trial conducted on June 23, 1997, the Honorable Ronald 
Nehring, Judge presiding (Doc. 6-23-97). However, the particular 
set of facts which ostensibly led to the declaration of mistrial 
are limited to the examination of one particular witness, the 
alleged victim, defendant's wife, Susan Patten (Tr. June 23, 1997). 
Mrs. Patten testified on direct examination with respect to various 
incidents, the particular details of which are unimportant to this 
appeal, occurring on the dates alleged in the Informations (Tr. p. 
2-20). 
Cross-examination was conducted by Mr. Sandack (Tr. p. 20-45). 
At a point in time Mr. Sandack commenced a series of questions 
attempting to seek information with respect to certain written 
statements that Mrs. Patten may have made in conjunction with the 
complaints (Informations) that were filed against Mr. Patten. The 
following exchange thereupon took place:2 
ATTORNEY 1: The practices [sic] I think what she is 
referring to is that she made complaints to the police 
officers and that's why she's saying she filed 
complaints. She's had no contact with me or anyone in 
the Prosecutor's Office. She may have had contact with 
a victim's (unintelligible). 
Right. 
Who did you have contact with? 
Cindy. 
Is Cindy in the Courtroom today? 
Yes. 
She's personally (unintelligible)? 
Yes. 
What's her name? 
Cindy. 
Cindy what? 
I have no idea. 
And how many times have you had 
conversation with her? 
MS. PATTEN: Maybe four. 
ATTORNEY 2: When were those conversations? 
MS. PATTEN: I don't recall. 
ATTORNEY 2: You also had conversations with your 
counsel, did you not, about these same allegations? 
MS. PATTEN: My Counsel? 
ATTORNEY 2: Your attorneys. 
MS. PATTEN: Yes. Attorney for 
MS. PATTEN 
ATTORNEY 2 
MS. PATTEN 
ATTORNEY 2 
MS. PATTEN 
ATTORNEY 2 
MS. PATTEN 
ATTORNEY 2 
MS. PATTEN 
ATTORNEY 2 
MS. PATTEN 
ATTORNEY 2 
2 "ATTORNEY 1" is Keith Stoney, West Valley City Prosecutor, 
and Mr. Sandack is "ATTORNEY 2." 
6 
ATTORNEY 2: Your attorney • And did she advise 
you with respect to the filing of these charges? 
MS- PATTEN 
ATTORNEY 2 
MS. PATTEN 
ATTORNEY 2 
MS- PATTEN 
ATTORNEY 2 
MS. PATTEN 
ATTORNEY 2 
MS. PATTEN 
ATTORNEY 2 
Yes. 
Her name is Laurie Hubert? 
Yes. 
Is she married to John Hubert? 
I believe so. 
John Hubert of the 
I don't know her husband. 
West Valley City Prosecutorf s Office? 
I believe so. 
Do you have any knowledge as to 
whether or not she had discussions with Mr. John Hubert? 
MS. PATTEN: 
ATTORNEY 1: 
Could we find our 
Laurie Hubert? 
MS. PATTEN: 
ATTORNEY 1: 
Hubert? 
MS. PATTEN: 
ATTORNEY 1: 
MS. PATTEN: 
JUDGE NEHRING: 
earlier than that, 
ATTORNEY 1: 
Not that I'm aware of. 
Your Honor, I'm a bit concerned here. 
[sic] when she was represented by 
She is my divorce attorney. 
I know, but when did you see Ms. 
When did I see her? 
Yes. 
The day I went to Court last week. 
Well, you were represented by her 
weren't you? 
Maybe Counsel knows. Can somebody 
just give me a date as to when she appeared as counsel? 
MS. PATTEN: She appeared as counsel 
ATTORNEY 2: Let me ask you this. Your own 
attorney, Joy (inaudible). 
She's not my attorney. 
She was your attorney. 
Yes. 
And she moved for leave to withdraw 
1997. Is that correct? 
Correct. 
Did you hire Laurie Hubert at or 
about the same time as Joy (inaudible)? 
MS. PATTEN: Yes, I did. 
ATTORNEY 2: And how were you introduced to Laurie 
Hubert, if I can ask? 
MS. PATTEN: 
ATTORNEY 2: 
MS. PATTEN: 
ATTORNEY 2: 
on February 25, 
MS. PATTEN: 
ATTORNEY 2: 
MS. PATTEN: 
ATTORNEY 2: 
MS. PATTEN: 
ATTORNEY 2: 
MS. PATTEN: 
JUDGE NEHRING 
ATTORNEY 2: 
I was just given her name. 
By whom? 
I believe Cindy gave it to me. 
By Cindy? 
Uh-huh. 
Could you approach (unintelligible) 
I think we better, 
[whispered conversation] 
JUDGE NEHRING: We'll be in recess for ten. 
(Tr. 42 - 45) 
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After the recess court reconvened and Judge Nehring made the 
following statement which constitutes the bench ruling and brief 
discussion which occurred with counsel: 
JUDGE NEHRING: Back on the record. West Valley 
City vs. Patten. It has been clear on the record that 
Ms. Patten retained Ms. Huber as her counsel, and that 
her husband, John Huber, is the assistants'prosecutor for 
West Valley City. I have learned from Mr. Stoney that 
the date that Ms. Huber was retained by Ms. Patten was 
after the date of filing these cases. However, the 
relationship between Ms. Patten, Ms. Huber and Mr. Huber, 
is such that irrespective of the date the attorney-client 
relationship was formed, it raises questions of 
impropriety that rise to the level in my mind to warrant 
mistrial which I am now granting. I want to say that 
there is no direct evidence of impropriety, and that I am 
extremely confident that there was none. However, 
vigorous advocacy of the kind that I have come to expect 
from Mr. Sandack, could in my view, lead to requests to 
explore the relationship, if any, between Mr. Huber and 
Ms. Huber and this case. And that kind of enterprise in 
my view would be contrary to the interests of justice, 
and the interests of justice here is having this case 
tried on the merits as expeditiously as possible. And 
accordingly in addition to granting a mistrial, based on 
the court's own motion, I am going to reassign this case. 
I am going to reassign this case because I have 
participated in discussions with possible resolution of 
the case. I know considerable amount about this case 
beyond what I've heard from the witnesses and beyond 
whatf s on the record on the case. And in my view my 
continued involvement on this case would be 
inappropriate. Unless there are questions from counsel. 
SANDACK: Your Honor, I'd like the court to note 
that, while I take it as a compliment that my advocacy 
may result in that, that I haven't made any requests. 
JUDGE: No you absolutely have not. I raise that 
only as a specter of something that might be appropriate 
if we were to continue, but that's certainly true that 
you haven't suggested it. 
STONEY: I would like to take benefit of the record 
for just a moment. 
JUDGE: Absolutely. 
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STfcNEY: Alright, we would like to make clear that 
the court is not ordering that there is a conflict with 
the prosecutor's office at this point in time. Is the 
court stating that? 
JUBN3E: I am not. 
ST0NEY: As well I would like it clear that the 
reason that the court is ordering a mistrial is because 
of the appearance of a potential problem. 
JUDGE: Correct. There is an appearance of 
impropriety, there is no direct evidence of conflict of 
interest. 
STtJJEY: And may the court also note that the 
prosecution has objection to that, to the court's order? 
And I'll leave with that, that we don't believe that that 
is the remedy that should be sought given what the court 
has found at this point in time. 
JUfGE: Well, then I'm just going to go into a 
little more detail about. . . . 
STONEY: And then I'm going to respect what the 
court says. I just wanted the objection on the record. 
JUDGE: And it's noted, and my concern, just so it's 
on the record is this, that the prospect of possible 
conversations with attempts to manipulate prosecution of 
a criminal case in order to advance a client's interest 
in a civil case is so distasteful a piece of conduct, but 
it' s still something that this relationship suggests 
might be available, and it's because of that possibility, 
that appearance, that I've made this ruling. And I'll 
close again by saying there's no direct evidence that 
that has happened. Thanks for your patience. We'll be 
in recess. 
(J.R. 2 - 5 ) 
Subsequently after some jockeying back and forth between 
counsel as to what language the formal order should contain, the 
trial court entered its written order of mistrial on October 2, 
1997 (R. 67, 68). 
On November 3, 1997, defendant filed Motions to Dismiss on 
double jeopardy and improper termination grounds with supporting a 
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memorandum. (R. 169; 139-152) The City responded on November 21, 
1997 with its1 Objection to Motion to Dismiss. (R. 69-78) The 
defendant replied with a Response to Plaintiff's Objection to 
Motion to Dismiss on January 22, 1998. (R. 79-86) 
On January 26, 1998 Judge Judith S. H. Atherton heard oral 
argument (Doc. 1-26-98) and on March 18, 1998 denied the 
Defendant's motion by Memorandum Decision (R. 41-43; 87-89; 172-
174). 
Judge Atherton declined in her decision to address the issue 
of whether or not there was a "manifest necessity" for declaring a 
mistrial on the basis stated by Judge Nehring from the bench or 
contained within his formal order of mistrial, but rather indicated 
that Judge Nehring had a "clear and compelling basis" for declaring 
a mistrial under U.C.A. 76-1-403(4)(c)(iii)(Supp. 1997), i.e., 
"prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attributable to 
the state, making it impossible to proceed with trial without 
injustice to the defendant or state". She reasoned that "although 
the order of mistrial does not address the judge's findings 
concerning his recusal, those findings on the record support the 
order of mistrial." Thus Judge Atherton denied the defendant's 
motion to dismiss on statutory grounds. (R. 87-89). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Double jeopardy bars retrial. 
There was no manifest necessity underlying the declaration of 
mistrial, the defendant did not consent thereto, thus retrial and 
reprosecution would violate the double jeopardy clauses of the 
10 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article One, 
Section 12, Utah State Constitution. 
uJTs 
2. There was jwimproper termination. 
The trial courtf s declaration of mistrial took place before 
the verdict, for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, after the 
first witness was sworn, under circumstances where the defendant 
did not consent to the termination, did not waive his right to 
object to the termination, and there were no other factors making 
it statutorily improper or illegal to proceed, thus constituting an 
improper termination barring retrial of the defendant pursuant to 
§ 76-1-403, U.C.A., as amended. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PRINCIPALS OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY BAR RETRIAL OF 
THIS MATTER AND MANDATE DISMISSAL. 
The first question which should be addressed is whether the 
defendant's jeopardy rights attached to the proceedings below. 
This issue usually arises in the context of a jury trial; jeopardy 
attaches once "a jury has been sworn and empaneled." State v. 
Nilson, 854 P. 2d 1029, 1031 (Utah App. 1993) citing State v. 
Ambrose, 598 P. 2d 354, 358 (Utah 1979). The rule applicable to the 
case at bar is that a defendant in a bench trial is placed in 
jeopardy once the first witness is sworn. State v. Byrns, 911 P. 2d 
981,984 (Utah App. 1995). 
In either situation* both the United States and Utah 
Constitutions guarantee "that no person shall be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense." State v. Nilson, at 1031 citing 
11 
State v. Parson, 818 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah App. 1981). Witnesses had 
been sworn and testimony elicited in the trial court below. Hence 
double jeopardy protection is applicable to the proceedings. 
The double jeopardy provisions of the Utah State Constitution, 
Article I, §12, and the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
are in substance identical. The double jeopardy provision of the 
Fifth Amendment was made directly applicable to the states by the 
United States Supreme Court in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 
S.Ct. 256, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). Moreover it is apparent that the 
courts of the State of Utah have traditionally adopted standards 
consistent with the federal courts in analyzing the sort of double 
jeopardy question presented in this case. See generally State v. 
Ambrose, supra. 
The general rule as it arises in the context of mistrial was 
enunciated in State v. Ambrose as follows: 
Utah law also establishes that discharge of the jury 
without a verdict operates as an acquittal unless (1) the 
defendant consents to the discharge or (2) "legal 
necessity" requires the discharge in the interest of 
justice. 
Ambrose at 358. 
The "concept of legal necessity" has been variously expressed 
as "special necessity," "absolute necessity," or "manifest 
necessity." Ambrose at 358, quoting from United States v. Perez, 
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824)(in which the United 
State Supreme Court enunciated the original "manifest necessity" 
standard, stating that the power to order a mistrial should be 
12 
"used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and 
for very plain and obvious causes", 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580). 
The federal trial courts are now guided by Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 26.3, Mistrial (adopted 1993), which states as 
follows: 
Before ordering a mistrial, the court shall provide an 
opportunity for the government and for each defendant to 
comment on the propriety of the order, including whether 
each party consents or objects to a mistrial, and to 
suggest any alternatives. 
The substantive law regarding mistrials was not changed by 
Rule 26.3, however it has been stated that federal practice under 
the rule "does require an elevated awareness of the substantive law 
in relation to the competing interest of the parties." Mooref s 
Federal Practice, 3rd Ed., Mistrial § 626.3.06. It therefor is of 
some benefit in analyzing the case at hand. 
The basis of Judge Nehring's declaration of mistrial was not 
that the court found direct evidence of impropriety. The court 
stated that it was "extremely confident that there was, in fact, 
none." (J.R. 2) The court explicitly indicated that "it is not 
stating that there is a conflict, per se, in or with the West 
Valley City office and this case." (J.R. 4) 
If in fact there were a conflict in the West Valley City 
office, which the court did not find, then declaring a mistrial and 
ordering that the case be prosecuted by some other agency or 
attorney independent of the West Valley City office would have been 
not only an appropriate course of action for the court to take but 
an essential one. 
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Declaring a mistrial, but not disqualifying the West Valley 
City prosecutor from the case, explicitly announcing that there was 
not in fact a conflict, but only an appearance of impropriety (J.R. 
2, 3), then reassigning the case for trial before another judge 
without in any way addressing the likelihood that precisely the 
same scenario might arise again, only perpetuated the perceived 
problem. 
The fact that the alleged victim had retained an attorney who 
is the wife of an assistance West Valley City prosecutor, and that 
the attorney was retained at the behest of the victim witness 
counselor for West Valley City remains an unalterable fact of the 
case. The mistrial remedied nothing in that respect. If the West 
Valley City prosecutor were to present evidence again, the same 
appearance of impropriety would exist, and counsel for the defense 
would have at least some ability to exploit the questioned 
relationship again. 
The trial judge has the authority and is responsible for 
administering justice. The trial judge is "responsible for 
carrying [the trial] forward as efficiently and expeditiously as 
possible consistent with fairness and thoroughness in administering 
justice." Hanks v. Christensen, 354 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1960). 
That did not happen in this case. There was no manifest necessity 
for the abortive result. Consequently, these cases should be 
dismissed. 
The double jeopardy clause protects an individual not 
simply from subjection to more than one punishment, but 
from being twice put to trial for the same offense. The 
guaranty assures that, with certain exceptions, an 
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individual will not be forced to endure the strain, 
embarrassment, anxiety and expense of a criminal trial. 
State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354, 357 (Utah 1979). 
Ambrose involved somewhat similar factual circumstances. 
There the trial court sua sponte declared a mistrial and discharged 
the jury upon the basis of certain untoward comments made by the 
prosecutor while jurors were being questioned with respect to the 
likelihood that a verdict would be reached. The Supreme Court 
found the mistrial to be unnecessary. The defendant argued that 
certain statements made to the jury by the prosecutor after the 
state had rested but during the course of the jury's deliberations 
were made in bad faith in an effort to motivate the defendant to 
move for a mistrial which would allow the state to retry the case. 
The Court agreed that the remarks of the prosecutor were 
unnecessary and improper but did not agree that they were initiated 
out of a bad faith desire to provoke a request for a mistrial. 
Ambrose at 357. 
Neither the trial court nor the defendant in this situation 
believes West Valley City prosecutor Keith Stoney acted in bad 
faith. Whether there was bad faith between Mrs. Huber, the divorce 
lawyer, and the West Valley City assistant prosecutor, Mr. Huber, 
is to say the least beyond the record. In any event Judge Nehring 
specifically found that there was no such evidence, but only the 
appearance of impropriety. Courts must refrain from prematurely 
declaring a mistrial unless it determines "after careful inquiry" 
that it is "the only reasonable alternative to insure justice under 
the circumstances." Ambrose at 358. 
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These circumstances are somewhat analogous to United States v. 
Jorn. 400 U.S. 480, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971). The 
Supreme Court in Jorn held that the trial judge, one Judge Willis 
Ritter, in the United States District Court for the District of 
Utah, who on his own motion declared a mistrial to enable the 
government's witnesses to consult with their own attorneys, abused 
his discretion in discharging the jury, thus barring reprosecution 
of the defendant. The standard of review regarding mistrials in 
the federal courts is the same as that in the state of Utah, i.e., 
abuse of discretion. U.S. v. Jorn, supra, 91 S.Ct. at 558, 400 
U.S. at 487; State v. Castle, supra, 951 P.2d at 1111. 
Jorn stands for the proposition that while a motion by the 
defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove any barrier 
to reprosecution, even if the defendant's motion is necessitated by 
prosecutorial or judicial error, in the absence of such a motion 
the manifest necessity doctrine, 
[S]tands as a command to trial judges not to foreclose 
the defendant's option until a scrupulous exercise of 
judicial discretion leads to the conclusion that the ends 
of public justice would not be served by a continuation 
of the proceedings. 
U.S. v. Jorn, citing U.S. v. Perez, (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 
6 L.Ed. 165 (1824). 
The Jorn court summed up the dilemma as follows: 
The conscious refusal of this Court to channel the 
exercise of that discretion according to rules based on 
categories of circumstances, see Wade v. Hunder# 336, 
U.S., at 691, 69 S. Ct., at 838, reflects the elusive 
nature of the problem presented by judicial action 
foreclosing the defendant from going to his jury. But 
that discretion must still be exercised; unquestionably 
an important factor to be considered is the need to hold 
litigants on both sides to standards of responsible 
16 
professional conduct in the clash of an adversary 
criminal process. Yet we cannot evolve rules based on 
the source of the particular problem giving rise to a 
question whether a mistrial should or should not be 
declared, because, even in circumstances where the 
problem reflects error on the part of one counsel or the 
other, the trial judge must still take care to assure 
himself that the situation warrants action on his part 
foreclosing the defendant from a potentially favorable 
judgment by the tribunal. 
U.S. v. Jorn, 91 S.Ct. at 557, 400 U.S. at 486. 
The court in Jorn described circumstances wherein it would 
have to be said that Judge Ritter acted with greater abruptness 
than did Judge Nehring at the case at hand. Nonetheless the 
situation is analogous and the ultimate holding is compelling to 
the facts of this case. The Supreme Court stated: 
It is apparent from the record that no consideration was 
given to the possibility of a trial continuance; indeed, 
the trial judge acted so abruptly in discharging the jury 
that, had the prosecutor been disposed to suggest a 
continuance, or the defendant to object to the discharge 
of the jury, there would have been no opportunity to do 
so. When one examines the circumstances surrounding the 
discharge of this jury, it seems abundantly apparent that 
the trial judge made no effort to exercise a sound 
discretion to assure that, taking all the circumstances 
into account, there was a manifest necessity for the sua 
sponte declaration of this mistrial. United States v. 
Perez, 9 Wheat, at 580. Therefore we must conclude that 
in the circumstances of this case appellee's 
reprosecution would violate the double jeopardy provision 
of the Fifth Amendment. 
It has been said that a trial court should focus on at least 
four considerations in determining whether to order a mistrial: 
(1) The opinions of the parties about the propriety 
of the mistrial; 
(2) The alternatives to a mistrial, including those 
least harmful to a defendant's rights; 
(3) Placing deliberations concerning the motion on 
the record; and 
(4) Whether the defendant would benefit from the 
declaration of mistrial. 
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Mooref s Federal Practice, 3rd Ed., § 626,3.04, Factors 
Courts Should Consider in Determining Whether to Order 
Mistrial. 
By taking these factors into consideration the trial court can 
increase the probability that mistrial will be entered only when 
there is a manifest necessity to do so. 
If there is a manifest necessity for a mistrial, retrial and 
reprosecution do not violate the Fifth Amendment. Illinois v. 
Sommerville, 410 U.S. 458, 471, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 35 L.Ed.2d 425 
(1973). On the other hand the double jeopardy clause bars a 
defendant's retrial when the defendant objects or does not consent 
to mistrial and an appellate court subsequently finds the trial 
court abused its discretion in so declaring. U.S. v. Jorn, 400 
U.S. at 481. 
A defendant may waive a double jeopardy defense if he consents 
to a mistrial. However the record must reflect that the defendant 
was given an adequate opportunity to state a position or suggest 
alternatives to a mistrial. See for example, Glover v. McMackin, 
950 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Car. 1991)("In light of the drastic 
consequences attached to a finding of consent, we reject 
respondent's position that the failure of the petitioner to object 
on the record constitutes consent"). 
We cannot know what the result would have been had the trial 
court given the state and the defendant an opportunity to discuss 
the relative merits of the impending order of mistrial, which 
appears to have come as a surprise to both. The better practice 
would have been to inquire affirmatively as to each party's 
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position. Further it may have been advisable for the trial court 
to defer an order of mistrial to allow the parties time to consider 
alternatives and to formulate their comments for the record. 
Finally there should have been a methodical evaluation of the 
considerations, particularly those which are unfortunately not on 
the record having to do with what the judge said he knew about the 
case, including how he came to acquire this knowledge, which may or 
may not have warranted assignment to another judge, before deciding 
whether to order a mistrial. In this case none of these 
appropriate considerations and deliberations occurred. The court 
simply announced a mistrial. 
Defense counsel did not consent to this. Although the 
defendant's counsel did not explicitly object, there was no implied 
consent to a mistrial. As the court in Ambrose, supra, stated, 
lf[w]e will not presume that mere silence in this situation can be 
equated to waiver of such an important constitutional right." 
Ambrose, 598 P.2d 361, citing Curry v. Superior Court of the City 
and County of San Francisco, (citation omitted), as follows: 
When a trial court proposes to discharge a jury without 
a legal necessity therefor, the defendant is under no 
duty to object in order to claim the protection of the 
constitutional guaranty, and mere silence in the face of 
an ensuing discharge cannot be deemed a waiver. 
Utah State Supreme Court went on to say, 
Additionally, the record clearly indicates the court 
acted so abruptly in discharging the jury that defendant 
counsel had no opportunity to object. The double 
jeopardy protection is not so ephemeral that it vanishes 
if an accused does not anticipate and object to every 
unexpected action on the part of the court. 
Ambrose at 360-361. 
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A more recent case, State v. Nilson, supra, specifically 
affirms the language in Ambrose that "failure to object or silence 
should not be construed as implied consent to a mistrial, 
particularly when the trial court acts abruptly and there is no 
opportunity to object." The Nilson court further approved the rule 
in State v. Thompson, 58 Utah 291, 199 P. 161, 165 (1921), 
previously cited by defendant, wherein even though, 
[T]he statements of counsel did not unequivocally 
constitute consent to termination, the Supreme Court 
found that double jeopardy barred a subsequent 
prosecution for the same offense, noting: "upon the whole 
record, as made at the investigation, we cannot say as a 
matter of law that defendant consented to the order 
declaring a mistrial and discharging the jury." 
Nilson at 1032. 
In Nilson the defendant specifically stated "I have no 
objection to the [state's] motion to dismiss." Nonetheless the 
Utah Supreme Court stated "We, however, concur with the trial court 
that the retrial of Nilson is impermissible." Nilson at 1032. The 
court stated: 
Given the dialogue about a probable directed verdict, the 
rapidity of the proceedings, and lack of argument by the 
State that the circumstances constituted "legal 
necessity" for declaration of a mistrial, we find 
Nilsonfs response was inadequate to constitute consent. 
Id. at 1032. 
The proceedings involving Judge Nehring's ruling reflect that 
both Mr. Stoney and Mr. Sandack were "surprised" by the court's 
sudden declaration of a mistrial. The record does not support that 
there was any prior discussion with respect to the mistrial ruling 
itself and in the absence of any further testimony or evidence, to 
require that there be an affirmative objection, or to construe Mr. 
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Sandack? s obviously unpremeditated remarks as consenting to the 
order would be patently unfair. 
The record more accurately seems to portray Mr. Sandack as 
being caught flat footed in his statement to the court, "Your 
Honor, Ifd like the court to note that, . . . that I haven!t made 
any request." This is not the language of consent. Nor did judge 
Nehring at any time indicate that objection would have been 
anything but futile and meaningless. See Glover v McMackin, supra, 
950 F.2d at 1239 (6th Car. 1991). 
The circumstances here are analogous to those presented by 
Nilson; Ambrose; Jorn; McMackin; et al. There is nothing in the 
record which rises to the level of consent. Certainly, as to these 
matters of constitutional gravity there is no evidence that the 
defendant knowingly and intelligently consented or waived his right 
to object. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019 
(1938). 
In this case none of the appropriate considerations and 
deliberations occurred, there was no "manifest necessity," and the 
defendant did not consent to the mistrial. Retrial and 
reprosecution are barred by the principles of double jeopardy. 
POINT II 
RE-TRIAL IS BARRED BY AN IMPROPER TERMINATION 
There is little in the case law to distinguish § 76-1-403, 
U.C.A., as amended, 1974, entitled "Former Prosecution Barring 
Subsequent Prosecution for Offense Out of Same Episode," from 
settled principles of double jeopardy under the state and federal 
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constitutions. It "appears to codify the double jeopardy guarantee 
and its exceptions." State v. Nilson, supra, 854 P.2d at 1031. 
Under § 76-1-403, U.C.A., a prosecution is barred by a former 
prosecution if the former prosecution resulted in acquittal, 
resulted in conviction, was improperly terminated, or was 
terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant 
necessarily requiring a determination inconsistent with a fact that 
must be established to secure conviction in a subsequent 
prosecution. Section 76-l-403(1)(1). 
There was an improper termination in this case pursuant to § 
76-l-403(d) (3) (iii), and subsequent prosecution is therefor barred. 
A termination is improper if it takes place before the 
verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and if the 
jury is waived, after the first witness is sworn. Section 76-1-
403(4), U.C.A. 
In this case the prosecution of defendant took place before 
the verdict. It did not amount to an acquittal. It took place 
after the first witness was sworn. Presumptively the termination 
was improper. 
Sub-section (4) of § 76-1-403 goes on to state circumstances 
under which termination of prosecution would *&&&- be improper, 
specifically if (a) the defendant consents to the termination; or 
(b) the defendant waives his right to object to the termination; or 
(c) the court finds and states for the record that the termination 
is necessary because (i) it is physically impossible to proceed 
with the trial in conformity with the law or (ii) there is a legal 
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defect in the proceeding not attributable to the state that would 
make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of 
law or (iii) prejudicial conduct in and out of the courtroom not 
attributable to the state makes it impossible to proceed with the 
T 
trial without injustice to the defendant or the state; or (4) the 
jury is unable to agree on a verdict or (5) false statements of a 
juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial. 
Judge Atherton ruled that there existed "clear and compelling" 
evidence supporting the proposition that there was "prejudicial 
conduct in and out of the courtroom not attributable to the state 
making it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to 
the defendant or the state," This is not supported by the record. 
If it is so, what was the conduct? The record is devoid of any but 
the trial judge's sort of secondary consideration that he knew 
quite a bit about the case from settlement discussions. He did not 
ask counsel if they felt he could not be fair, and there is nothing 
of record even in general terms to indicate why such action would 
be necessary. 
The Supreme Court ruled in Ambrose, supra, that since the 
trial court's findings were deficient ". . .we have no basis from 
which to conclude whether the court engaged in the scrupulous 
exercise of judicial discretion required when dealing with the 
important rights here involved." Id. at 360. It appears that 
Judge Nehring gave some thought to the declaration of mistrial, but 
as to the reasons Judge Atherton assigned for denying the 
defendant's motion to dismiss, there is no basis to conclude that 
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"the court engaged in the scrupulous exercise of judicial 
discretion required.11 Judges often hear and discuss matters off 
the record with counsel and the parties. That does not perforce 
require recusal and mistrial. 
Judge Nehring did not say whether he had learned a lot about 
the case by purposefully interjecting himself into settlement 
discussions, or somehow accidentally became embroiled in 
discussions between counsel. If a trial judge is going to 
knowingly participate or otherwise allow himself to get pulled into 
settlement discussions, he must let counsel know prior thereto that 
the result may be a mistrial, giving counsel the opportunity to 
decide whether to consent or object. To wait, participate in 
discussions, and then declare a mistrial based upon knowledge 
gained from the discussions, takes away counsel's opportunity to 
consent or object at the point in time it would be meaningful. 
The record does not disclose the nature of discussions or how 
it came to be that Judge Nehring involved himself, but it puts 
trial counsel in a very awkward position if the judge voluntarily 
involves himself in settlement discussions. At what point should 
counsel say, "Judge I object to your further participation"? By 
this time it may already be too late. 
One possible construction is that Judge Nehring may have felt 
that the trial was going to be aborted anyway because of the 
impropriety he had perceived during examination of Mrs. Patten, so 
why not see if he could settle the case by involving himself in 
settlement discussions? This must of necessity be speculation but 
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it makes some sense. If this was the case, he should have made it 
known before participating, that he was going to mistry the case. 
Since the record is devoid of the actual discussions or 
circumstances, it cannot be said there is a "clear and compelling 
basis" for declaring a mistrial. But even if there were, inquiry 
would still have to be made into whether there was a good cause for 
the judge to put or allow himself to get into a position in which 
he knew or should have known a mistrial might be the result without 
first allowing counsel to consent or object. 
Additionally, § 76-1-403, U.C.A., provides that reprosecution 
is proper if: 
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the 
termination is necessary because: 
... 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not 
attributable to the state makes it impossible to proceed 
with the trial without injustice to the defendant or the 
state. 
See, State v. Castle, supra, at 1112. ("[l]n entering its 
order of mistrial, the court should have more closely tracked the 
statutory language.") Judge Nehring made no such finding or 
statement. His comment that he knew "a considerable amount" about 
the case does not satisfy this provision. Thus reprosecution is 
not allowable. 
The defendant did not consent to the termination. Although 
the defendant did not in so many words object to the termination he 
certainly did not waive his right to object to the termination 
inasmuch as he was never asked and there is no evidence of a 
knowing and intelligent waiver on the record. Johnson v. Zerbst, 
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supra. There was no consent to the termination and the defendant 
did not waive his right to object thereto. 
Given all the circumstances, the same arguments previously 
raised under the double jeopardy standard, can be reiterated here. 
There simply was no good reason to declare a mistrial. There was 
an improper termination, the defendant did not consent, and any 
attempted subsequent prosecution is therefor be barred. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Athertonfs Order denying the defendant's motion to 
dismiss should be reversed. s~\ . 
DATED this J/(jP day of /£^^^^^T^998. 
BULLEN 
for Defendant/Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ^rtf day of October, 1998, I 
cause 2 true and exact copies of the foregoing document to be 
mailed via the US Postal Service, first class postage prepaid, to 
the following: 
J. Richard Catten 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
3600 South Constitution Blvd. 
West Valley City, Utah 85119 
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APPENDIX "A" 
SECTION 76-1-403, U.C.A. 
ui ST 1 76-1-403, Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution 
for offense out of same episode 
Page 1 
Utah Code §76-1-403 
WESTS UTAH CODE 
TITLE 76. CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL 
PROVISIONS 
PART 4. MULTIPLE 
PROSECUTIONS AND DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY 
Current through End of 1996 General and 2nd 
Special Sessions 
§ 76-1-403. Former prosecution barring 
subsequent prosecution for offense out 
of same episode 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or 
more offenses arising out of a single criminal 
episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or 
a different offense arising out of the same criminal 
episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense 
that was or should have been tried under section 
76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(i) Resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) Resulted in conviction; or 
(iii) Was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) Was terminated by a final order or judgment 
for the defendant that has not been reversed, set 
aside, or vacated and that necessarily required a 
determination inconsistent with a fact that musl be 
established to secure conviction in the subsequent 
prosecution. 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution 
resulted in a finding of not guilty by the trier of 
facts or in a determination that there was 
insufficient evidence to warrant conviction. A 
finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an 
acquittal of the greater offense even though the 
conviction for the lesser included offense is 
subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated. 
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution 
resulted in a judgment of guilt that has not been 
reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty 
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated 
and that is capable of supporting a judgment: or a 
plea of guilty accepted by the court. 
(4) There is an improper termination of 
prosecution if the termination takes place before 
the verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an 
acquittal, and takes place after a jury has been 
impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or. if 
the jury trial is waived, after the first witness is 
sworn. However, termination of prosecution is 
not improper if: 
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; 
or 
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to 
the termination; 
(c) The court finds and states for the record that 
the termination is necessary because: 
*22002 (i) It is physically impossible to proceed 
with the trial in conformity with the law; or 
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not 
attributable to the state that would make any 
judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a 
matter of law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the 
courtroom not attributable to the state makes it 
impossible to proceed with the trial without 
injustice to the defendant or the state; or 
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; 
or 
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire 
prevent a fair trial. 
As last amended by Chapter 32, Laws of Utah 1974. 
Copyright (c) west Publishing Co. 1996 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works. 
APPENDIX "B" 
ORDER OF MISTRIAL 
Keith L. Stoney, Bar No. 3868 
WEST VALLEY CITY PROSECUTOR 
3600 S. Constitution Blvd. 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
(801)963-3331 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH (WVC), 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
RANDY PATTEN, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF MISTRIAL 
Case No. 971000887 
Judge Ronald E. Nehring 
The above captioned matter came before this Court for trial on June 23, 1997. Defendant 
was present with counsel, Roger Sandack and Plaintiff was represented by Keith L. Stoney, West 
Valley City Prosecuting Attorney. 
FACTS 
Plaintiff called witness and adduced evidence during the course of the trial. During the 
course of trial, testimony disclosed that the alleged victim had retained private counsel to act on 
her behalf in various divorce proceedings. The victim's private counsel is the wife of a West 
Valley Assistant Prosecutor. The taking of evidence ceased at that point. 
CONCLUSION 
While there is no direct evidence of impropriety and the Court is extremely confident that 
i 
iwrrnN MISTRIAL ORDER 
there was, in fact, none. The Court finds that the mere possibility of conversations between the 
Assistant Prosecutor and his wife, the victim's private attorney, suggests an appearance of 
impropriety such that the Court, sua sponte, on its own motion and against the prosecutions 
objection, declares a mistrial. The Court further notes that it is not stating that there is a conflict, 
per se, in or with the West Valley City office and this case. 
ORDER 
The Court declares a mistrial with respect to the trial of the above matter. 
DATED this ^ day of^eptembet, 1997. ^ v 
THI^I)/]Sisif.ltfCT'dOURt \ 
2 
PATTTNMIS1RIAI ORDI R 
APPENDIX "C" 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
IN THE.THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VAT.LEY DEPARTMENT 
WEST VALLEY CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RANDY PATTEN, 
Defendant. : 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 971000887MC 
: 971000888MC 
: 971000889MC 
JUDGE JUDITH S H ATHERTON 
This matter came for hearing on defendant's Motion to Dismiss. West Valley City 
was represented by Keith Stoney, defendant by Herschel BuUen. Defendant argues that the 
court improperly terminated the trial, and therefore, subjected defendant to double jeopardy. 
The court found that there was an appearance of impropriety "based on the possibility 
of conversation between the Assistant Prosecutor and his wife, the victim's private attorney" 
See Order of Mistrial, p.2. That issue was introduced to the court by way of defendant's 
cross examination of the victim. The court recessed and spoke with attorneys in his 
chambers. Upon return to the courtroom, the court found that defendant's line of 
questioning could "lead to requests to explore the relationship, if any, between Mr. Huber 
[the assistant prosecutor] and Mrs. Huber fhis wife] and this case [,] [a]nd that kind of 
vt> 
enterprise would be contrary to the interests of justice". Transcript.a at —. 
In addition, the judge reassigned the case on it's own motion because of having 
participated in discussions concerning a plea settlement, finding that he knew a "considerable 
amount about this case beyond what... [he'd] heard from the witnesses and beyond what ... 
[was] on the record on this case". IJL The basis of the judge's reassignment of the case to 
another judge is a clear and compelling basis for declaring a mistrial under U.C.A. 76-1-
403(4)(c)(iii) (Supp. 1997), "[prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attributable 
to the state, mak[ing] it impossible to proceed with trial without injustice to the defendant or 
state". The judge, having heard pertinent information concerning the pending case outside of 
the formal court proceeding, acted properly to pr*ysrve defendant's right to a fair trial. 
Although the Order of Mistrial does not address the judge's findings concerning his 
recusal, those findings on the record support the order of mistrial. As such, this court need 
not address other arguments. 
Therefore, defendant's motion is denied. 
DATED this 18th day of March, 1998. 
GE JUDITH S H ATHERTON 
*£» •_. . ,y 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
Decision to Herschel Bullen, Attorney for Defendant, 39 Exchange Place, Suite 200, Stock 
and Mining Exchange Bldg, SLC UT 84111 and to Keith Stoney, West Valley City 
Prosecutor, 3600 Constitution Blvd. WVC UT 84119. 
DATED this 18th day of March, 1998. 
